Quantum on Stellar

Where Stellar's move to quantum-safe cryptography stands, what is still open, and what people have built so far: signatures, zero-knowledge proofs and privacy.

Community page, not run by SDF.

Quantum Preparedness PlanSDF

  1. 1ML-DSA in contracts2026

    Contract accounts can check post-quantum signatures: CAP-87, in Protocol 30 (Bell).

    Testneton, protocol 30

    Mainnetvote on 23 Nov

  2. 2Quantum-safe signers2027

    Any account adds one next to its Ed25519 key. Same address, opt-in.

    Planned

  3. 3Ed25519 retiredNo date

    No longer accepted for new transactions, from a ledger set by how close the threat is.

    Not scheduled

Statuses as of 19 Nov 2026

Hashes onlyZK and privacy research, as of 19 Nov 2026

Your device makes the proof. Stellar checks it.

STARK proofs checked by a contract with nothing but hashes: no pairing curves, no trusted setup.

Your devicemakes the proof

45 KB of proofnothing but hashes

Stellar testneta contract checks it48–50 M instructions, 12% of one transaction

A research prototype: not audited, the hiding of the secret is unreviewed, and at these settings it is not yet at post-quantum strength.

The details, and what has been measured

A quantum computer weakens hash functions but does not break them. We are measuring how far Stellar can go on hashes alone: STARK proofs checked by a contract, with no pairing curves and no trusted setup.

The latest step is the check at the centre of a privacy pool: a proof that a secret is one of a million leaves of a tree, with a one-time tag so it cannot be used twice. It is generated in a browser and verified on testnet. It is not audited, and not at post-quantum strength with these settings: that takes larger proofs.

Instructions to verify
48–50 M
Share of one transaction
12%
Proof size
45 KB
Generated in a browser
1 to 2 s
On a phone
not measured yet
Contract size
84% of the limit
Curves, trusted setup
none
Hiding of the secret
unreviewed
Audited
no

Still openIn the plan, without a date

Three things the plan leaves for later

Dormant accounts

Accounts nobody is watching would be frozen. Can their owners still prove they are theirs?

TriedRecovery after the cutoff

What the plan says

Every address shows its public key, so accounts nobody is watching are exposed too, and would be frozen once Ed25519 is retired. Can an owner still prove the account is theirs from the seed, or do the funds stay locked?

SDFWill open it to community design instead of deciding alone.

Proofs without pairings

Today's zero-knowledge proofs rest on curves a quantum computer breaks. What takes their place?

TriedFrom your phone to Stellar, Verify a STARK on Stellar

What the plan says

Zero-knowledge proofs on Stellar today use pairing curves, which a quantum computer breaks the way it breaks Ed25519. Nothing drops in at a similar cost. The plan names STARKs and lattice-based proofs as candidates.

SDFWill bring the ZK teams together on a shared research agenda.

Validator signatures

Consensus is signed with Ed25519 too: hundreds of validators to move together.

TriedNothing listed yet. Add your work

What the plan says

Consensus messages are signed with Ed25519 too. The plan handles them apart from accounts, with an upgrade to the consensus protocol: hundreds of validators to coordinate, not tens of millions of accounts.

SDFNo date or design in the plan yet.

Built so farListed as each stands today

Four works listed, and room for yours

  • On testnetProofs

    From your phone to Stellar

    Your device generates a STARK proof and a contract on testnet checks it with hash functions only.

    Research prototype, not audited.

    by Carlos de la FigueraRun it here

  • On testnetProofs

    Verify a STARK on Stellar

    A Soroban contract that verifies S-two proofs directly: no pairing curves, no trusted setup, no SNARK wrapper.

    Research prototype, not audited.

    by Carlos de la FigueraSee the three proofs and their cost Read the write-up

  • On testnetDormant accounts

    Recovery after the cutoff

    A commit, then a reveal: a dormant key hands over to a new ML-DSA key, and whoever reads the reveal arrives too late to take it.

    Test seeds only. Recovering a real account would have to be a rule of the protocol.

    by Carlos de la FigueraSee how it works and what it costs

  • InactiveAccounts

    stellar-pq

    Post-quantum signatures for Stellar smart accounts: a Falcon-512 verifier and a Soroban account that uses it. Funded by the Stellar Community Fund; the code is public.

    Experimental and unaudited, as its README says. The project is marked inactive in the StellarLight directory.

    by Soundness LabsCode on GitHub

  • Your work

    Building something post-quantum on Stellar? Signatures, accounts, proofs or privacy: it belongs in this list. The list is kept in a public repository: add your work there with an issue or a pull request.

    Open the list

Read on

Stellar's own documents, and short answers

Sources9 documents and talks, Stellar's own first

From SDF

Protocol and standards

Short answers5 questions people ask
Is Stellar (XLM) quantum-safe today?

Not yet. Accounts and validators sign with Ed25519, which a large enough quantum computer would break; no such machine is publicly known. SDF's plan moves the network over in three stages, and the display at the top of this page shows where the first one stands.

Will I have to move my funds to a new account?

The plan says no. From stage 2, an existing account adds a quantum-safe signer next to its Ed25519 key and keeps its address and its balances.

What is ML-DSA?

A signature scheme built on lattices, standardised by NIST in 2024 as FIPS 204. Protocol 30 lets Stellar's smart contracts verify ML-DSA signatures, so a contract account can ask for one.

What does hash-based mean, and why does it matter?

Signatures and proofs built on elliptic curves all fall to the same quantum attack. Hash functions do not: a quantum computer makes them weaker, not broken, and larger parameters make up for it. STARK proofs rely on hashes alone, which is why SDF's plan names them as a candidate for zero-knowledge after pairings.

Is the demo on this page post-quantum?

Its kind of cryptography is; its strength is not there yet. With the settings that fit in one Stellar transaction today, the proof would not hold against a quantum attacker. Getting there means larger proofs: a matter of cost and limits, not of starting over.